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Failure to Administer a Drug and Causation 
In King v Western Sydney Local Health Network [2013] NSWCA 162 the appellant sought damages for 
the severe physical and intellectual disability she suffered as a result of foetal varicella syndrome 
(FVS) caused by her mother contracting varicella (chickenpox) in the second trimester of her 
pregnancy.  The mother had been exposed to the virus and sought advice from a doctor at 
Blacktown Hospital as she had not had the virus herself and therefore did not possess immunity.  In 
such circumstances at the time, the standard medical practice was to offer the mother varicella-
zoster immunoglobulin (VZIG) to boost her defence to the virus.  The appellant’s mother however 
was not offered this treatment and contracted chickenpox resulting the appellant’s condition.  
At first instance it was held that the respondent owed the appellant a duty of care, the scope of 
which included “an obligation to advise the [appellant’s] mother of the availability of VZIG and its 
potential beneficial effects in preventing or ameliorating chickenpox” and an obligation to offer to 
administer VZIG.1 Garling J also held (at [88]) that the duty had been breached as:  
a reasonable person in the position of the Hospital, acting through its medical staff, would have taken 
the precaution which the [appellant] alleged should have been taken, namely, that [the mother] 
ought to have been advised about the availability and potential benefits of VZIG, and the 
appropriateness, in her case, of her being administered that preparation. 
The issue of factual causation was framed by Garling J at [151] as: 
Had, on 6 May 2002, the medical staff at Blacktown Hospital, appropriately advised about and 
administered 600 international units of VZIG to Mrs King, the [appellant’s] mother, she would, on the 
balance of probabilities, not have contracted varicella on 16 May 2002.  
As a preliminary question his Honour had to determine whether if the appellant’s mother had been 
advised of the possibility of the VZIG treatment and been offered it, would she have accepted the 
administration of VZIG.   His Honour held that she would have and this was not challenged by the 
respondent. 
After detailed examination of the scientific evidence and the evidence of six experts, Garling J stated 
(at [274]): 
I have reached my conclusion on causation, namely, that whilst it is a possibility that VZIG, if 
administered to Mrs King, may have prevented her infection, it has not been proved that it was more 
likely than not to have been effective, by reference to the evidence. 
On appeal the appellant argued that the trial judge had failed to apply the correct test of causation 
and to take proper account of the evidence that VZIG’s propensity to prevent infection, in particular, 
a German study referred to as the Enders Table.  It was argued that the following established, on the 
balance of probabilities, that had the mother been administered VZIG on 6 May 2002, she would not 
have contracted the virus: 
(i) VZIG is a made-for-purpose product. 
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(ii) There was no evidence that during the first 72-96 hours of the exposure to varicella, the virus 
particle numbers would have reached such a level that the VZIG antibodies would not have been able 
to deal with them. 
(iii) The failure to administer VZIG occurred well within the 96 hour prescribed period. 
(iv) The foregoing matters boded well for VZIG to have its designed outcome. 
(v) All of the experts would have recommended the administration of VZIG to the appellant's mother. 
(vi) Whatever the limitations of the scientific evidence, it did not demonstrate that VZIG was not 
efficacious to neutralise virus particles and result in a non-infection outcome. 
(vii) The appellant developed CVS and the mother was infected with varicella.
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The members of the Court of Appeal considered the evidence and the approach taken by Garling J to 
determine if causation had been established by the appellant on the balance of probabilities.  The 
appeal was dismissed, Basten JA in dissent, with Hoeben JA giving the leading judgment. 
The scientific evidence 
The main evidence relied upon was a German study (the Enders Table) and evidence of six medical 
experts, five of whom gave opinions on the Enders Table.  Of the five experts, only one, Professor 
Curtis,  was of the opinion that on the balance of probabilities if the mother had been treated with 
VZIG, chickenpox would have been prevented.  This opinion relied upon the Enders Table as being an 
important factor. 
The other experts, however, identified three issues with acceptance of the German study. 
Classification of the study 
The Table had a low classification of evidence level as a scientific study as it was in essence an 
observational study.  However, as no studies of a higher evidentiary level were available, the Enders 
Table was the best evidence to assess the effects of VZIG in pregnant women. 
Dosage of VZIG in the study 
The dosage of VZIG given in Germany was almost three times the recommended dose in Australia 
and therefore Garling J was of the opinion that “the Table overstates the effectiveness of VZIG in 
[varicella-zoster virus] prevention when considering its application to the Australian administration 
practice” (King v Western Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWSC 1025 at [198]).   
The expert evidence appeared to indicate that the lower dosage was more likely to attenuate the 
virus rather than prevent it. On appeal, Hoeben JA pointed out that this evidence was important, as 
“prevention was that which was required for causation to be established in this case, not 
attenuation” (King v Western Sydney Local Health Network [2013] NSWCA 162 at [117]).  His Honour 
held that the trial judge was “certainly entitled to conclude that at the very least, some of the 
patients recorded on the Table as showing no infection would in the Australian context, have been 
likely to be infected with varicella” (at [118]).  At [138] he stated: 
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Far from adopting a mechanistic or probabilistic approach, his Honour was mindful of the limitations 
of the Enders Table and in particular, its applicability to Australia. As the difference in dosage 
between Australia and Germany illustrated, it was by no means clear that the appellant constituted a 
‘typical’ member of the cohort on which the Table was based. That cohort comprised persons to 
whom a dosage of between 1750 and 2000 international units had been given, whereas the appellant 
was a person to whom a dose of 600 international units should have been given. 
Basten JA pointed out that although the dosage was lower in Australia, none of the experts 
suggested that this dosage was too low to be effective (at [15]).  His Honour held that without 
evidence as to why the dosages differed in other countries and whether the results would be 
differed, the Enders Table results should not have been discounted on that basis (at [19]). 
Strike rate 
The Enders Table stated that 54 per cent of the patients in the study cohort given VZIG did not get 
infected.  However, in identifying this group, the study did not take into account the 10 to 15 per 
cent who would not have been infected even if they had not been given VZIG – the “strike rate 
issue”.  To include this group inflated the effectiveness of VZIG.   
Therefore Garling J adjusted the results to take this strike rate into account, adopting 10 per cent.  
This meant that of the 212 patients in the Enders study, 21 would not have contracted the virus even 
if not treated with VZIG.  Removing this group from the statistics, Garling J adopted the adjusted 
evidence that 44 per cent of the patients would not become infected, holding that “the Enders 
Table, as the best available scientific evidence, demonstrates that infection was prevented by the 
administration of VZIG in fewer than one half of the studied cohort” (King v Western Sydney Local 
Health Network [2011] NSWSC 1025 at [206]). 
On appeal Basten JA agreed that an adjustment was necessary, but held (King v Western Sydney 
Local Health Network [2013] NSWCA 162 at [21]): 
it is fallacious to say that VZIG is effective for only 44 out of every 100. Without VZIG, 90 in every 100 
pregnant women are infected; with VZIG, the figure is 46 in every 100, a reduction in round terms of 
50%.  From the alternative perspective, of every 90 women at risk, 44 (approximately 50%) will not be 
infected if VZIG is given. 
At [31] his Honour agreed with the appellant that the trial judge had “adopted an overly mechanistic 
approach” and that “[t]he scientific evidence … demonstrated that a causal connection was more 
probable than not”.   
The appellant argued that the expert evidence of Professor Curtis should be accepted that the Table 
should be adjusted to take into account the strike rate only in the non-infected group, not the whole 
of the cohort as Garling J did.  Hoeben JA held that the trial judge’s adjustment to the Enders Table 
was the preferred approach, pointing out that on Garling J’s approach less than 50 per cent of the 
cohort in the study who received VZIG did not develop the virus, and using the approach of 
Professor Curtis the “non-infection rate was no greater than 50 per cent” (at [123]).   
Ward JA agreed with Garling J’s adjustment to the Enders Table.  His Honour held that the 
appellant’s assertion that if the mother had been given VZIG it was more likely that she would not 
have developed the virus had to be considered against the statistic that if a mother contracted 
varicella, there was a 1 to 2 per cent chance of the virus being transmitted to foetus (at [190]).  
Therefore, administration of VZIG would result in “the risk to the foetus taken at the 2% figure 
would be reduced to 1.04-1.1% (1-0.45=0.55 0.02x0.55; 1-0.48 0.02x0.52) and taken at the 1% figure 
the risk to the foetus would be reduced to 0.52-0.55% (0.01x0.55; 0.01x0.52)” (at [189]).  Further, if 
the effect of VZIG was only to attenuate the virus rather than prevent it, “then it is not clear on the 
evidence what reduction, if any, there would be on the prospect of the foetus suffering FVS or the 
level of injury that would ensue if the foetus did” (at [193]). 
Therefore two of the three members of the Court of Appeal approved the trial judge’s assessment 
and use of the scientific and expert evidence. 
Factual Causation 
In the Appeal Court, Ward JA summarised that the appellant had to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that (King v Western Sydney Local Health Network [2013] NSWCA 162 at [186]): 
 The mother had contracted the varicella virus within 96 hours of visiting the hospital (not 
disputed); 
 The mother would have accepted the VZIG treatment had it been offered (not disputed); 
and 
 Administration of VZIG in the standard Australian dosage would have prevented the 
appellant from contracting FVS as a result of the mother’s infection of the virus. 
As the negligence occurred on 6 May 2002, the s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) applied.3 
The appellant argued that factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) was established and did not seek to rely 
upon the facts being an “exceptional case” as within in s 5D(2), despite the fact she was arguing that 
the respondent’s breach increased the risk of harm.  The argument, citing, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 
CLR 232 at [27]-[28] and Strong v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W) (2012) 246 CLR 182, was that as she 
did develop the virus, “the risk of injury came home in the relevant sense and causation was 
established in that the hospital's conduct materially contributed to the injury” (at [146]).   
At [145] Hoeben JA pointed out that reliance upon Strong v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W) did not 
assist the appellant as the case was one of increased risk: 
As I read the analysis of the plurality, there are real difficulties in applying the ‘but for’ test to the 
concept of ‘increase in risk’. The reference to and analysis at [24] - [27] of Bonnington Castings Ltd v 
Wardlaw (1956) UKHL 1; (1956) AC 613 illustrates the difficulty. Far from assisting the appellant's 
submission, the analysis in Strong v Woolworths of ‘increase in risk’ in the context of a ‘material 
contribution to harm’ is strongly suggestive that in most of those cases, the ‘but for’ test will not be 
satisfied and that recourse will have to be had to s 5D(2) CLA. 
As for the Chappel v Hart test of causation, Hoeben JA held that to apply the test as the appellant 
argued would always lead to a finding of causation even if there was a very low prospect of the risk 
being avoided (at [149]). The risk of infection was one the appellant had already been exposed to, 
regardless of the respondent’s omission.  Therefore it could not be established that the respondent’s 
failure to offer and administer VZIG was a precondition to the increased risk of harm simply because 
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the risk eventuated as this “presupposes an affirmative answer to the fundamental causation 
question” (at [147]), that question being that the appellant was one of the persons if given VZIG was 
likely not to suffer the virus (at [148]).   His Honour (at [151]) stated his preference for Mason P’s 
judgment in TC by his Tutor Sabatino v New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 380 at [59] as the “correct 
approach” to material contribution: 
A defendant who exposes a plaintiff to a risk of injury or who, by omission, fails to take reasonable 
steps to avoid or minimise that risk is not liable unless the risk comes home in the sense that the 
court is ultimately satisfied on the balance of probability that the defendant's breach caused or 
materially contributed to the harm actually suffered. 
The negligent omission that is alleged to have increased the risk of harm must have either caused or 
materially contributed to the harm suffered for there to be causation.  Therefore, Hoeben JA noted 
that it had to be established that had the VZIG treatment been given, it was likely that the appellant 
would not have been infected (at [152]).  Based on the evidence the appellant failed to establish that 
the omission of the respondent was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm she 
suffered. 
Ward JA held that there was no evidence before the court to allow a conclusion that the 
administration of VZIG at a dosage level that would attenuate the effects of the virus would lead to a 
material reduction in the risk of infection of the foetus (at [210]).  At [203] – [204] his Honour stated: 
The statistics do not support the conclusion that it is more likely than not that it would have 
prevented FVS in the foetus. Nor, in my opinion, does the evidence of the experts’ clinical experience 
in the use of VZIG. The failure to administer VZIG in effect meant that the already small risk that the 
appellant would contract FVS if her mother contracted chickenpox was not reduced to an even 
smaller percentage. The statistical correlation between the two events was such that whether or not 
VZIG was administered there remained only a very small possibility that the appellant would contract 
FVS (and the statistical studies and empirical evidence did not support the conclusion that it was more 
likely than not that the administration of VZIG would have prevented the mother contracting 
varicella, which was what gave rise to the risk). 
Therefore, the failure to give the VZIG to the mother was not in my view established to have been a 
necessary condition of the occurrence of FVS in the appellant. Even if the drug had been given to the 
mother, it was more likely than not that the mother would have contracted varicella and there 
remained a risk that the appellant would have been afflicted by FVS. The failure to administer VZIG 
did not in my opinion materially contribute to that risk (particularly if the effect of administration of 
VZIG would have been only to attenuate the effect of the infection and not to prevent it). 
Basten JA held that causation had been established.  His Honour referred to Spigelman CJ’s 
judgment in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [137] to hold that other evidence 
supported the inference that factual causation was established.  Guidelines issued by the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Australian Immunisation Handbook, and a 
publication by the Australian Society for Infectious Diseases all stated that VZIG should be given to a 
pregnant woman who is not immune to the chickenpox.  Therefore his Honour held that “[t]his 
material was more than sufficient to justify a finding of causation which, in terms of the duty 
identified, should be made” (at [32]). 
Exceptional case? 
The analysis of the statutory tests of causation in Strong v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W) suggest that 
if the argument is that the negligence increased the risk of harm in the context that it materially 
contributed to the harm, usually the “but for” test will not be satisfied and to establish causation 
would require a consideration of whether it was an “exceptional case”. 
The appellant did not raise s 5D(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) at trial which provides: 
In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, whether negligence 
that cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as 
establishing factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not 
and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.4  
However on appeal the provision was raised in oral submissions, the submission being that if the 
Chappel v Hart approach argued by the appellant was not within s 5D(1)(a) it would give rise to an 
“exceptional case” as in s 5D(2). However the submission was not further developed and no 
argument was provided as to why this would be an “exceptional case”.  As the issue had not been 
raised at trial, Hoeben and Ward JJA held that it could not be considered – Hoeben JA because the 
issue would require the benefit of evidence and full argument (at [155]), and Ward JA because to 
permit s 5D(2) to be considered would give rise to procedural unfairness (at [222]).  Ward JA also 
noted that in this case there was an attraction to rely upon s 5D(2) because of the ethical difficulties 
in conducting studies to provide more reliable evidence between the giving of VZIG and the 
prevention of FVS (at [221]).  However, his Honour did not think that this was an “exceptional case”, 
adopting the reasoning from Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420 at [443], as 
argument that the failure to offer or administer VZIG that might have made the occurrence of the 
appellant being infected less likely could be accepted as causation. 
Basten JA did not think that the appellant’s eschewing reliance upon s 5D(2) at trial necessarily 
prevented it from being considered upon appeal.  At [34] his Honour stated: 
like the relationship between duty, content and breach, questions of factual causation and scope of 
liability, as separately identified in s 5D, do not readily fall into separate and independent watertight 
compartments. Valuable as it is to separate the ‘factual’ and ‘policy’ elements of causation, the 
separation is, to an extent, an artefact. It would be a triumph of form over substance to deny the 
plaintiff recovery on that basis. 
Content of the duty 
The duty owed to the appellant, noted above, was to advise the mother of the availability of VZIG 
and offer to administer it.  Basten JA pointed out at [4] that the conclusion of no causation was: 
counter-intuitive and apparently anomalous. The legal duty of care required that the mother be 
offered a treatment which was available for the purpose of boosting immunity to the chickenpox 
virus. In breach of that duty, the treatment was not offered. The harm which was sought to be 
avoided came to pass. Normally that sequence would allow an inference as to the causal link between 
the breach and the harm. It is necessary to be satisfied that there is a sound reason why that 
inference was not drawn in the present case. 
Further, at [33] his Honour stated: 
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The very risk which the treatment was designed to alleviate, and which eventuated, was, on the 
approach adopted below, not shown to be caused (and could not be shown to be caused on the 
available empirical studies) by the breach of duty. If that were correct, a real question would arise as 
to whether a legal duty of the kind formulated was appropriate. However, the existence and content 
of the duty pleaded were not challenged. 
Ward JA also referred to the duty but stated (at [198]): 
The fact that the relevant risk was of FVS to the foetus and that, by not giving VZIG, the very kind of 
thing that the relevant duty obliged the hospital to take reasonable steps to prevent in fact happened 
(i.e. the foetus being afflicted by FVS), does not of itself answer the test for factual causation. The 
failure to administer VZIG must have caused or materially contributed to the injury. 
Hoeben JA did not specifically refer to this point, however his statement at [141] does note that the 
duty of the hospital involved a public health issue, but this did not establish causation by itself.  At 
[141] his Honour stated: 
the fact that all of the experts would have recommended the administration of VZIG to the appellant 
does not advance the issue of causation. It does not follow that the experts agreed that if 
administered VZIG was likely to have been effective in preventing the contraction of varicella. What it 
indicates is recognition by the experts that the contraction of varicella by a pregnant woman can have 
serious consequences for both herself and her child so that where there was a chance that that risk 
could be avoided by the administration of VZIG, that chance should be taken. Given the potentially 
serious consequences of the development of varicella in those circumstances, it would be unethical 
not to administer VZIG when there was a chance of those consequences being avoided. This does not 
establish that those consequences were likely to have been avoided. As the primary judge 
appreciated, this was a public health issue, not one related to causation. 
Conclusion 
The decision of King v Western Sydney Local Health Network [2013] NSWCA 162 highlights the 
difficulties in establishing factual causation when the argument is that the negligence increased the 
risk of harm, that is, it materially contributed to the harm suffered.  The “but for” test does not 
always provide an answer, but it is not yet clear when the facts of a case may then be “exceptional” 
to allow normative considerations to determine whether a defendant should be held responsible for 
the harm despite the breach not being a necessary occurrence of the harm suffered. 
